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Article 2

ethics rather than to conform to the casuistic ~~rali_ty ·:legislate,
the Supreme Court; and finally with our active parti~IpatiOn 1? these e
we achieved recognition and acceptance by the hierarchy m our n
members of the lay apostolate.
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In conclusion J wish to take this opportunit~ to extend my gr ·ful
thanks to Bishop Lohmuller, our Episcopal Advisor, Father Schere1 our
Moderator, Bob Herzog, our Executive Secretary an~ to all my_ f .ow
officers and members of the Board of Directors for their cooperat10 1 10d
dedication to the service of the Federation.
Finally, 1 wish to reiterate my si~cere tha nks_ for the many heart ing
communications which I have received as President.
S incerely yours, in Christ,
Charles A. Bauda, M.D.
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The Retarded and.
· The Criteria for the Human
Stanley Hauerwas

·.
The author is a professor of
theological studies at Notre Dame
Unive rsity . RecenLiy he was on sabbatical leave at The Joseph and
Rose K ennedy Institute for the
Study of R eproduction and Bioethics where he studie d the concept
of a "Christian m edical ethics. " His
article evaluates the setting of standards to determine "humanness,"
particularly in reg.ard to th e
retarded.

us forge t how inappropria te it is
for the preservation of o ur humanity to justify the exclusion of some
men from human care a nd concern
on gro unds that they fail to meet
suc h ·'crite ria.'· T he appropriate
mo ral context for raising the questio n of the "essentially" huma n
should no t be an attempt to determine if some men a re or are not
human, but rather what we must be
if we are to preserve and enhance
what humanity we have. In other
It is often a rgued that the evalua- words the question of the c riteria
tion of the development and appli - of the hum an sho uld not be ra ised
cation of new biomedical technol- abo ut others but only abo ut ourogy depends on the view o ne has selves.
of man. The deg ree o ne thinks man
Many raise the question of the
is different from other a nimals and
"d
istinc
tively" huma n in an attempt
in what that difference consists
to
place
some limits on what they
seems to be crucial for such issues
perceive
as the dehumanizing poas the prolongatio n of life, the limte
ntia
l
o
f
biomedical technology.
its or uses of behavior modificaFor
example,
they a rgue that we
tion, a nd the permissibility of hushould
not
try
to
c reate "better human experimen tation. Even though
ma
ns"
thro
ugh
positive
genetic mathe centrality of o ur view of man
nipulation
,
as
these
procedures
viofor such decisio ns seems obvious,
late
ma
n's
dignity
and
capacity
for
how the "distinctively human" is
self-determination.
For
example
in
to be understood and used is a mata
recent
Chicago
Studies
(Fall
.
ter of controversy. This difficulty
1972),
William
May
a
rgues
that
we
may be an indication that the re is
something mo ra lly askew about the should not do what we can do
general methodological assumption because:
..... man does d iffer, and differs
that criteria for th e human are reradically , in kind from ot her animals
quired for the work of bioethics to
and that this difference is rooted in
advance. Fo r this assumption makes
his capacit y for conceptual tho ught,
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but humanizing care beyond
uring the ir survival is simply no ·arranteed since they lack the
entia! conditio ns to claim the are
provided fo r those th a t a re . ully
human ." Such treatment tra!- tlly
becomes a self-fulfilling pro. ~cy
as we dehumanize them th ugh
impersonal and institutional
uelty o r , in some ways even m
deof
structive, the smothering C<!
It is unclear, however, if this kind pity. Not to be able to thin k . we
o f appeal to the "distinctively" hu- think, to talk as we talk , or to ) as
ma n is sufficient to place limi ta- we do is to forfeit o ne's righ t · be
tio ns on o ur technolog ical po w ers. treated with respect due to ar her
Fo r example, many justify greate r hum an.
scientific manipulatio n by appealThe presence o f the re ded
ing to similar conceptions of man serves as a significant ·test c< for
as th e being open to consta nt sel f- a ny a tte mpt to dete rmine t h ·dismo dificatio n through o ur capacity tinc ti vely" human . F o r sure
any
fo r self-determination .
)uld
c rite ria o f the human that
justify less than human ca' for
Inhumane Treatment
Bo th sides of this d e bate fail to the re tarded on the ground that
o ur
notice tha t their understanding o f they fall o utside the purview
the "dis tinctive ly" human embodies species is m o rally suspect. T h pervalues that warrant inhumane treat- verse e ffec ts o f such a limited -~ nse
ment toward some in our society o f the human can be see n no o nly
because they do not comply with in the kind of care we provit · for
suc h c rite ria. In their enthusiasm many o f the retarded in our s· :iety
to assert the dignity of m a n as either but wi th the stigm a we ·ass .:iate
enha nced or destroyed by tech- with re tardation . T o desc ri be ,meno logy , they formulate criteria o f o ne as re tarded is not a tee 'l ical
the hum an that appear in o ur c ul- decision based o n neutra l ~ entitura l contex t as an ideology fo r the fic d a ta a nd a nalysis; the c oteria
stro ng. F o r example, such c rite ria that d e te rmin e re tardatio n ha '.: less
clearly e mbody o ur ass umptio n that to do with the " weakness·· 1 1 the
ma n's rational and cognitive a bility re ta rd ed th an with the com r lexity
is what ma kes us human. Yet this o f the d e mands o f o ur soci~t y as
belief is the basis _fo r th e inhumane we ll as o ur to le rance o f de .. w tion.
treatme nt and care our society pro- In a socie ty already so in h um ane.
vides fo r the retarded, as we assum e we can ill afford to e nshrine our
suc h people are fundamenta ll y oth- inhumanity in formal criteria that
e r than and fo reign to the human pu tati vely are presented to p revent
community . Our respo nsibility to tec hn o logy's e nc roachment o n the
them extends to keeping them alive, "essentiall y" human.
propositional speech, and self-determin atio n . It is a difference, mo reover.
implicitly recognized by the majo ri ty
o f contemporary scientists and is affirmed in a very strik ing way in a
comme nt made by Willard Gaylin,
M.D., professor of psychiatry and
law at Columbia University, when he
wrote: 'T he human being is the o nly
species capable of systematically altering its "no rmal"" biological syste m
by use of its equally "no rmal" intellectual capacity .'"
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Thts argument can be made in a
less dramatic way by po inting out
that the criteria o f the dis tin c tive ly
human are no t simply a list o f e mpirical characte ristics. The no tio n
of the human is a conceptualizatio n
that m akes meaning ful o r be tt e r intelligible why we associate certain
empirical features with be ing human at a ll. In other words th e evidence for our particular unde rstanding of the human is d e pe nd ent
on prior conceptual and no rmative
commitments that must be justified
philosophically and ethically , s ince
it cannot be assumed th at the "empirical" conditions we have lea rn ed
to associate with be ing man are
nece~sary to the huma n conceptually and no rmatively und erstood.
As James Gustafso n has said , "A
pre-judgment about what is and is
not 'truly human' probably lurks
in the judgment about what data to
use in desc ribin g the hum a n ."
Therefore, to raise the questio n o f
the criteria o f the human is not
first an empirical question, but a
conceptual-mo ral claim about how
the nature of man sho uld be und erStood. W e wrongly assume that
what our eyes pe rceive as " no rmal"
is what we should morally und e rstand men to be qua human. The
presence of the re tarded helps us
f~el the oddness and the problema~Jc nature of this assumption a nd
Its attendent ethical implications.

in o pera tio nal terms. ( The Hastings
Center Report, Nov., 1972). Fletc her's " pro file" includes fifteen positive and five negative propositions
that are meant to provide necessary and suffic ie nt grounds fo r attributing the sta tus o f human to
a no ther. To be man we must be
capa ble o f self-awareness, sell-contro l, have a sense of time, futurity
and past, be ca pab le of re lating to
o thers, show concern fo r others, be
able to communic ate, exert contro l
ove r o ur existence, be c uri o us, be
o pen to c hanges, have a pro pe r bala nce o f ratio nality a nd feeling, and
have a unique identity. Negatively,
men are no t a ny of the fo llowing:
a nti-artific ial, essentially pa re nts,
sexual, worshipers, o r a bundle o f
rig hts. I am sure each o f us will
have o ur special pro ble m with o ne
o r mo re o f these c rite ria especially
as some seem to make recomme ndations about ho w to be a good o r
m ature man rathe r th at the minimal
c o nditio ns necessary to be a man .
Ho weve r it is not my purpose to
try to evaluate each of these "crite ria" se parately, as I am interes ted
in trying to make a mo r e ge ne ral
po int co ncerning the vagueness o f
this list. For Fletcher cla ims to
have developed a list o f "ope ratio nal" crite ria that a re e mpirically
specifiable , but all th e conditions
listed have o nly the vaguest empirical correlates. For example, what
"empirical" signs could be g iven as
a necessary warrant to d e mo nstrate
Fletcher
The significance of this argument that someone had control ove r him~an be illustrated by contrasting self that wo uld be useful to th e
It with Joseph Fletcher's attempt doctor?
to provide the biomedica l decision
The issue is complicated by Fle tmaker with a profile of the human cher's failure to distinguish be tween
November, 1973
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c rite ria that are necessary and those faith in the Stanford-Binet test s ce
a
that are sufficient to determine it is extremely unclear what su
test measures (even psycholo sts
the huma n . For example, if a criterio n s uch as having a prope r balance are not all sure what intelligt ce
between rationality a nd feeling is a involves o r how the Stanford-£ tet
necessary conditio n for being hu- relates to intelligence) . There re,
man . then I sus pect some of us are even o n e mpirical grounds it i• tot
in perpetual peril of losing o ur sta- clear that the o ne o peratio nal rittus as humans. However, Fletche r erion Fletc he r gives to mar~ ff
does identify minimal inte llige nce the human js a nything less than ··biprovided by the neo-cortical fun c- trary . Mo re troublesome tha n his
tio n as the necessary empirical con- is what empirical features Fie 1er
d itio n on which a ll these o ther c har- wo uld associate with the abse n · of
acteristics depend. " In a way." he neo-cortical function, since it 1 uld
an
says, "this is the card inal indica to r. in volve anything fro m the loss
EEG
to
the
beginnings
o
f
se
;
ity.
the o ne all the othe rs are hinged
upo n . Before cerebratio n is in play. Fle tche r seems to base his po ion
in this respect o n the assu m ion
o r w ith its end, in the abse nce o f
that activities such as instru n ntal
the synthesizing func tion of the
cerebral cortex, the person is no n- learning a nd cognition resio entire ly in the neo-cortext, b u this
existent. Such individuals are objects but no t subjects." (p. 3) Flet- has no t yet been decisively tab·
c he r's emphasis o n this aspect of lished. Of course, no one ' luld
of
o ur physiology rests on his assump- wish to de ny the significan
the
neo-cortext
for
o
ur
be
h
Jio
r.
tio n that to be human is to be rational, or in his language, "Homo is yet we sho uld at least be awaJ that
the ide ntificatio n of brain an<.. n ind
indeed sapiens, in order to be homo.
The ratio, in a no the r turn of speech , is fraught with philosophic<l and
is what makes a pe rson of the vita. empirical difficulties . Rece1 • reM ere biological life, before mini- search suggests that we m t t be
careful how we draw the disti ction
mal intelligence is ac hieved o r after
it is lost irretrievably, is without per- between body a nd mind si ..:e it
sonal status." (p. l) Thus for F let- may be that o ur spirit and in1 1vidu·
c h er a ny individual who falls belo w ali ty is more dependent on mere
the I.Q. 4Q-mark in a Stanford-Bi net biological or bodily processes than
test is "questionably a person," and we had tho ug ht.
if you score 20 or below you are not
Purpose of C riteria
a person.
M o re substantively it can be
asked what purpose Fletche r's criBefore raising the more substan- teria are to serve - that is, what contive issues about Fletcher's position, c lusio ns should be drawn fro m them
there are some empirical issues that and what tasks should we try to
sho uld be considered. It is interest- perfo rm with the m? They seem to
ing that Fletcher places such g reat le nd themselves to an inte rpreta-

. tion tha t wo uld exclude ma ny that
are now receiving care as human beings. Should we cease trying to obtain better li ving a nd learn ing conditions fo r the profo undly ·a nd moderately r etarded? What sho uld be
done with the elde rly who are no
longer able to meet the crite ria o f
being members of the Pe psi-ge ne ration? Sho uld we cease de velo ping
resources for the care of those
whose intellige nce is · no t up to
coping wit h our modern society
because they place a drain o n o ur
resources while not contri buti ng
to the services o r a rt ifacts o f o ur
civilization?
This "pro file" o f man does no t
I suspect, provide o pe ra tio nal cri~
teria a ny doctor would recognize,
but it is rathe r a statement o f th e
working assumptio ns about the
value o f huma n life that are a li ve
in our culture. The strong stress o n
the value o f intellige nce as the
necessary conditio n for all hu man
a~t~vity faithfu lly mirrors the Joyahtles o f o ur soc iety. Intelligence,
~owever, is no t an end in itself, no r
IS our ability to reason s uffic ie nt to
make us human if being human has
anything to do with being humane.
To assert such criteria as necessary
to be hu man separate d fro m the
values and community for which
they exist
· ·IS to nsk
·
perversions we
can scarcely afford in a wo rld that
already condemns some c hildren
to miserable
·
exis te nce because they
~annot exercise ·'problem-solving"
Intelligence. We fail to notice that
=~h cri teria are really goals thro ugh
htch we manipulate a nd destroy
some fo r the good of the "no rma l."
The important m o ral questio n is

not whether the re tarded meet o r
sho uld meet "criteria of the human"
we ha ve established, but whether
we do no t become inhuman by being concerned with such j udgments
rather than providing the retarded
with respect and care.
Our society's hig h value o f ratio nality tends to make us fo rge t
that o ur ability to think cannot be
separated from our nature as social
beings. A s G. H. Mead taught, we
wo uld never be able to disting u ish
the "me" a nd the " not me," the bedroc k of awareness and reason . if
we were not graced with the presence o f the other. This descript ive
point provides th e basis for the
more s ubsta nti ve ethical claim that
o ur ca pac ity to reaso n rightly is a
corre la tive of o ur ability to regard
o thers wit h respec t. The use of the
c rite ri o n o f intelligence to warrant
the exclusio n of those that appeal
and think differe ntly fro m us is to
c ut off the m oral basis of o ur ability to be ra tional at all. Put in m o re
tradi ti o nal te rmino logy, our ratio na l ab ility is no t the prior prin c iple
of o ur mo ra l activity for we are able
to reason because we are fundame ntally socia l beings. To em phasize o ur ratio nal ability separated
fro m its social-mo ral context is
to intellectualize arbitrarily the
power o f cognition and language.
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Being Human
T o be a man is to be able to perceive a nd respo nd to other m e n
wit h recognitio n of care. It is unc lear to me wha t e m pirical criteria
a re correlative of this unde rstanding o f man since the fo rms of re-
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spo nse a re ric h and va ried. That
we need to develop some empirical
rules of thumb to c heck our arbitrariness in some o f the hard c ases
occasioned by our increased tec hnological skill is no t in questio n.
As Eric Cassell suggests , "The function o f mo rality in medicine is no
lo nger simply to protect the weak
and the sic k from indiffere nce o r
venality , but to protect them also
fro m mercy grown overwhe lming
by tec hno lo gical advance.'' Howe ve r, the de ve lopment of suc h rules
o ( thumb must be develope d with
the kind o f e xac tness that such
cases e nta il, rather than with the
gene ra lity that opens them to the
pe rversio n o f justifying o ur uncare
o f those who do not fit our c urrent
standards o f " full y human."

reach o ut and provide cart
those who have no " right" to i•
more conc retely, as impor ta•
crite ria a re to inform deci
we canno t make them do a ~
work o f e thical judgment a nd
ment fo r all cases, since no l
ion is going to relieve o r s!
make less troublesome the b·
of dec iding to ope rate to sa'
life o f a severely retarded chi!
try to substitute " imperson e~.
teria" for wh at should be the
agony of suc h decisio ns is alre
sacrifice mo re of our human it"
we can sta nd.

or
'ut
as
ns,
he

Robert F. Rizzo, Ph .D . and Joseph M. Yonder

JU-

erJ ld
len
the
To
crilral
1 to
1an

Finally. I think we sho ut, feel
mo re the o ddness of trying to
termine this o r tha t as the c riten hat
makes us human. The con1 ons
of be ing human form a far tO\ om·
In this respect, I think a strong
ple x patte rn to be ever redu· I to
cautionary no te needs to be inte rsome thing like "criteria ." r oo
jected a bout deve loping c rite ria
quick appeals to the myst •
of
of the human that will someho w rebeing hum an c an be but excu ~ , for
lieve us of the hard choices tha t we
cloudy and sloppy thinkin ~ that
are confro nting in modern medi ~
atte mpts to evade some of th-. hard
c ine. Fo r c rite ria that are suffiissues we are confronting, bt they
c ient fo r a ll the kinds of cases we
may also be pro found respo n ·s to
confro nt will be· so vague tha t the ir
the huma n sense that ultimatt· v we
conc re te implications will be a mare no t o ur own creato rs. T1 ne a
biguous at best. Even if you try to
ma n is to be ope n to the call o ~.v hat
make suc h c riteria mo re ope ra tio nwe a re no t, and there is the re f ·e no
a l fo r the d octor by tying the m to
c ha nce that our humanity \\ ' I be
e mpirical charac teristics. it is by
enhanced by excluding fro r our
no means c le ar that the mo ra l quesranks those who do not undt.: , rand
tions involved in many o f these
as we. W e must therefore app oach
c ases will be any more resolvable .
the attempt to de velo p crit\ ria of
For e ve n tho ugh suc h. crite ria may
help you dec ide that this life is not the human with the humilit'- that
"fu lly human ," the questio n o f rec ognizes tha t we would he less
whether c are should be give n still than human if we did not recngnize
that there are limits to what c an be
re mains , I suspec t tha t we a re human exac tly to the extent we can bro ught under our control.
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Synopsis .
Using the 1968 Journal of the
American Medical A ssociation article on brain death by the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical
School and the 1972 lAMA rep ort
by the Task Force on Death and
Dying of the Institute of Society .
Ethics and the Life Scie nces on a
re-examination of brain death as
SP_ringboards for a contemporary
VIew of clinical death. the authors
present the ambiguities and problems intrinsic to these articles and
concurrently propose an alternative
in I he form of a \\'Orkin~ hypo1hesis
for clinical death as it re lates 10
care of the terminal palient.

Clinical Death
With technic al progress in the
care of the sick and dying comes a
number of problems and a ne ed to
r~examine traditional presuppositions, concepts a nd procedures. Advances in che mical and mec ha nical
means for sustaining life have raised
questions concerning the clinic al
definition of death and the tests for
determining when clinical death has
occurred. Though these questio ns
have important relevance to a wide
range of legal as well as perso na l

Novembe r. 1973

and medical matters, they have immedia te bearing o n the role of the
physician in his relationship of
trust and service to the patient and
community and on the quality care
of the terminal patient. These are
o ur major co ncerns in reexamining
the de finitio n and criteria of clinic al death.
Medical techno logy has challe nged the moral and medical c riteria for determining death . Tec hnical advances in he alth care have
led some to put emphasis on "brain
death" rather than on heart and
respiratory cessation as the criteria
for diagnosing clinical death. The
stra in of moving from heart and
respiratory cessation to bra in dea th
reveals the inadequacy o f present
medical and moral guidelines in the
face of an increasingly sophisticated
technology. Deeply wo ven in the
c ulture o f o ur society , the re
e merges the central question of the
controve rsy. Are we really inte rested in the quality care o f the patient a nd partic ularly the te rminal
patie nt?
In the care of the dying, a redefinition of clinical death a nd its c rit e ria wo uld mean that d oc to rs
wo uld withdraw extraordinary measures for sustaining life much soon-
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